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Abstract
Patient safety is at the cornerstone of the delivery of quality anesthesia. A historically pervasive
patient safety threat related to the field of anesthesia has been the anesthesia workstation.
Although anesthesia delivery improvements are based on refining physical engineering
principles, they are also based on preventing human error. This DNP project uses an educational
process improvement design to generate an evidence-based simulation educational activity for
novice anesthesia providers to better prepare themselves for the reality of anesthesia workstation
malfunction and human error.
Keywords: Patient safety, novice nurse anesthetist, anesthesia workstation, educational
process improvement program, simulation-based educational activity, teaching plans
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Anesthesia workstations have significantly improved since their inception, and
improvements have been driven by various patient safety threats that have arisen
(Subrahmanyam & Mohan, 2013). Although workstation improvements are based on refining
physical engineering principles, they are also primarily based on preventing human error.
According to Mehta (2013), the majority (85%) of all closed claims referencing workstations
involved provider error, and 35% of claims were judged preventable if anesthesia providers had
performed pre-anesthesia workstation checks.
Formerly, researchers have analyzed reports of anesthesia-related human errors and
related them to equipment failure (Cooper et al. 1984). According to Kee et al. (2006), a case
report of a typical surgical case in which anesthetic gas was used, anesthesia providers identified
a malfunction that could lead to patient complications. In this case report, the workstation was a
Drager Narkomed, a standard workhorse in American anesthesia practice (Kee et al., 2006).
During the exemplar case, the anesthesia team could turn on two anesthetic gases
simultaneously. Consequently, all modern anesthesia workstations do not allow this problem to
happen due to a safety mechanism. However, if this safety mechanism fails, anesthesia providers
must be equipped to detect and address this malfunction to avoid delivering two anesthetic gases
at once, resulting in a patient safety threat. Fortunately, the mistake was noticed as two different
people turned on each gas. Kee et al. (2006) also discussed the near-miss malfunction of the
anesthesia workstation's vaporizer locking system. This mistake would have resulted in the
increased risk of too much anesthetic gas leading to intraoperative, postoperative complications,
and possibly death. Also, the contamination aspect of mixing volatile anesthetics would have led
to additional patient problems. (Kee et al. 2006).
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Mehta (2013) analyzed patient injuries related to gas delivery equipment claims from the
American Society of Anesthesiologists Closed Claims Project database from the 1970s to the
2000s. The authors found that claims decreased over decades, and outcomes became less severe
as technological advancements continued. Still, provider error contributes to adverse events, as
does a failure to complete a full mechanical check before anesthesia delivery (Mehta et al.,
2013). Also, Cooper et al. (1984) looked at a total of 1,089 preventable critical incidents. They
found that the most frequently reported issues involved neglecting to notice breathing circuit
disconnections, gas-flow control errors, and gas supply loss.
The components of the anesthesia workstation vary depending on age, manufacturer, and
model. The differences between older anesthesia workstations (Ohmeda Modulus, Excel, ADU,
Aestiva, and the Drager Narkomed, GS, Mobile, MRI, 2B, 2C, 3, or 4) are fewer than their
similarities (Tharp, 2014). However, these older workstations are becoming less common and are
slowly being phased out as manufacturers stop supporting technical services (Tharp, 2014). The
newest anesthesia workstation models have more clinical impact than the previous anesthesia
workstations because of the higher degree of computer-controlled systems, physiologic monitors,
workstation monitors, and electronic medical record integration (Tharp, 2014).
Novice nurse anesthetists are trained didactically and clinically through standardized
checkout procedures provided by the American Society of Anesthesiologists (ASA). In addition,
the ASA provides institutional guidelines for developing institution-specific checkout procedures
before the delivery of anesthesia (ASA Committee on Equipment and Facilities Task Force,
2008). ASA requirements for safe delivery of anesthesia care include ensuring that there is a
reliable source and delivery of oxygen at any appropriate concentration up to 100%, a reliable
means of positive pressure ventilation, backup ventilation equipment available and functioning,
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controlled release of positive pressure from the breathing circuit, anesthesia vapor delivery,
adequate suction, and a means to conform the standards for patient monitoring (ASA Committee
on Equipment and Facilities Task Force, 2008). These items are categorized into two safety
checklists that verify each competent of the anesthesia workstation (ASA Committee on
Equipment and Facilities Task Force, 2008). One safety checklist to be completed daily, and
another checklist to be completed before each procedure requiring anesthesia (ASA Committee
on Equipment and Facilities Task Force, 2008). At certain facilities there are different anesthesia
workstations in use and the type of anesthesia workstation varies from facility to facility. This
becomes an added potential for safety threats due to the lack of familiarity within the hospital
and the different anesthesia workstations.
Human error, anesthesia workstation malfunction, and failure to follow protocols remain
safety threats. For example, neglecting to follow the ASA’s (2008) pre-anesthesia
recommendations for an anesthesia checkout may result in an anesthesia mishap. An anesthesia
providers inability to quickly interpret and address a developing anesthesia workstation
malfunction could result in patient harm. Also, an anesthesia provider lacking proper backup
equipment or lacking the knowledge on when to use such equipment could result in patient harm.
Needs Assessment
Despite improvements in the anesthesia workstation designs and equipment, safety
threats and errors continue. Anesthesia workstations have evolved to a point that one checkout
procedure is not applicable to all anesthesia delivery systems currently on the market (Feldman
et al., 2008). Guidelines can serve as a template for developing checkout procedures that are
appropriate for each individual anesthesia machine design and practice setting rather than
offering standardized items (Feldman et al., 2008). There is a need for the development of
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additional educational programs for novice anesthesia providers aimed at reducing patient safety
threats and errors related to the use of the anesthesia workstation. The primary aim for this
project is to develop an evidence-based educational process improvement program to evaluate if
a simulation-based activity will increase the competency level of novice anesthesia providers in
identifying and reducing safety threats in the use of anesthesia workstations.
Problem
Human error, as described by Oster and Braaten (2018), "refers to inadvertently making
an error or doing something that should not have been done" (p. 403). Specific human factors
range from administering anesthetics and include environmental, organizational, and individuals
involved in anesthesia delivery (Oster & Braaten, 2018). Therefore, in the context of human
factors and the challenges associated with safety practices used with anesthesia workstations, this
Doctor of Nursing Practice Project will create an educational process improvement program for
novice anesthesia providers learning mastery of anesthesia workstations. In addition, anesthesia
providers are focused on preventing future safety concerns related to anesthesia workstations.
This educational process improvement program addresses research related to anesthesia
workstation alarms of the anesthesia workstation's specific purposes and functions through
simulated anesthesia malfunctions requiring rapid and correct responses by anesthesia providers.
Purpose
The purpose of this project will be to create an educational process improvement program
to standardize the education of novice anesthesia providers to prevent safety threats related to the
anesthesia delivery workstation.
Project Question
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What is the evidence to support the creation and validation of an educational process
improvement program to improve novice anesthesia providers competency to prevent safety
threats regarding the anesthesia workstation?
Conceptual definitions
Anesthesia workstations are defined as devices that deliver a precise but variable gas
mixture made of life-sustaining and anesthetizing gases (Tharp, 2014). Therefore, the anesthesia
workstation is also known as the anesthesia delivery system (Tharp, 2014).
Nurse anesthetists are highly skilled practitioners in the field of anesthesiology (ASA,
2014). The education of nurse anesthetists focuses on the principles such as non-malfeasance,
beneficence, and patient safety (ASA, 2014). The care team of anesthesiologists and nurse
anesthetists works closely to deliver safe anesthetic care to patients during surgery (ASA, 2014).
The head of the group is the anesthesiologist, while nurse anesthetists are the most abundant in
the hospital setting, providing most anesthetic delivery and patient care (ASA, 2014). The team's
responsibility is to assess the patient, develop a plan of care for anesthetic delivery, and support
the patient's well-being (ASA, 2014). In addition, it takes careful consideration to determine each
patient's course of action due to the risks of surgery (ASA, 2014).
An educational program is an organizational experience that allows for growth and
development while also leading towards a defined program objective (May et al. 2018).
Simulation as an educational technique is used to assess competency, promote team
training, and has been applied to nurse anesthesia as a tool to decrease human error (CannonDiehl et al. 2012). Simulations are imperative when speaking about the education of nurse
anesthetists and allow control of potential life-threatening situations that engulf the participants
in real-life scenarios (Cannon-Diehl et al. 2012). This allows the participants to think in the
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moment during a “simulated” experience so that they will be better prepared if said situation
arises in real life (Cannon-Diehl et al. 2012).
A safety threat is defined as a plausible threat that can cause serious harm as a result of an
intentional or accidental mishap (SDM, 2021).
Conceptual Model
Reason's (2000) Human Error: Models and Management theory is used in this project to
frame the construction of a simulation-based educational activity regarding the safe use of
anesthesia workstations. The model explores the connection between the person and the system
when evaluating safety and quality. The person approach looks at the individual at fault,
assuming that they are either forgetful, inattentive, or morally weak (Reason, 2000). The systems
approach looks at the environment in which the individual works assume that they are inherently
susceptible to making mistakes and that defenses should be built around them to prevent this
(Reason, 2000).
The anesthesia workstation safety mechanisms have evolved to coincide with this human
error model (Reason, 2000). Each specific safety mechanism on the anesthesia workstation has
been designed to counter human errors that caused patient harm. One clinical example of this is
the fail-safe mechanisms that prevent providers from delivering pure nitrous oxide (N2O) without
supplemental oxygen (O2). When nitrous oxide is delivered without enough supplemental
oxygen, the patient is subjected to a hypoxic mixture (<21% oxygen), leading to serious patient
harm.
The Reason model (2000) notes that blame can be placed on the anesthesia provider to be
incompetent and negligent in delivering a hypoxic mixture to the patient. Alternatively, the
model recommends a systems approach: the workstation should not be capable of delivering this
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dangerous hypoxic mixture in the first place. In looking at the Swiss cheese model, illustrating
Reason's (2000) perspectives, the anesthesia workstation is layered to prevent provider error and
eliminate error from reaching patients. Defensive barriers are engineered into the workstation
like the fail-safe mechanism mentioned above. They also include visual and auditory alarms,
physical barriers, and automatic shutdowns (Reason, 2000). At the same time, patients and health
care providers rely on anesthesia providers to interpret situations and act based on their
knowledge and experience. These defenses are implemented strategically, but holes (Swiss
cheese model) in these defensive layers can come from two reasons: operational failures and
latent conditions (Reason, 2000). The operational failures are unsafe actions committed by
anesthetists operating anesthesia workstations, while the latent conditions are dangerous
engineering principles or designs provided by the anesthesia workstation manufacturers. When
both barriers are breached, the result places the patient at risk for harm.

Review of Literature
Search Strategy
The project directors (PD) started our review of the literature by using the terms:
Anesthesia machine malfunction and anesthesia machine. We then expanded our search to more
specific areas of the anesthesia machine, including the search terms: pipeline failure, O2 supply
line, soda lime, carbon dioxide absorbent canister, APL valve, CO2 simple line disconnect,
unidirectional valve malfunction, anesthesia scavenger disconnect, scavenger system, anesthesia
bellows housing, GE, Drager, Aysis, Fabius, Narkomed, oxygen sensors failure, chain link 25,
anesthesia vaporizer malfunction, simulation-based educational activity, Nurse Anesthetists,
patient safety, novice nurse anesthetists, anesthesia workstation, learning exercise, and teaching
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plans. In addition, we gathered articles that include case reports, summaries, and clinical studies
that will support our reasoning behind our DNP project design throughout our search, which can
be found in Table 1. Due to the topic, there will be no experimental design studies. Studies are
observational or descriptive presenting patient case reports from claim databases.
Databases searched: PUBMED; CINHAL
Years searched: 1983 – 2021
Empirical (Research) Literature
Cooper (1984) performed a critical incident analysis to determine the causes of patient
harm related to the anesthesia workstation (human vs. mechanical error). A total of 1089
incidents were analyzed (Cooper, 1984). The method of data collection was a retrospective
survey as well as subsequently reported incidence after interviews (Cooper, 1984). There were
also incidents reported during the introductory interviews with the "trained observers" (Cooper,
1984). The essential information collected was related to human error during the delivery of
anesthesia (Cooper, 1984).
The study found that patients with more co-morbidities have more adverse outcomes than
those that were deemed healthier (Cooper, 1984). The majority of findings showed that most
machine malfunctions were able to be determined with a simple anesthesia workstation check.
Human error played a significant role in the determination of patient outcomes as well as
machine malfunction (Cooper, 1984). The limitations of the study are related to the many
potential ways to define incident types (Cooper, 1984). The retrospective approach and an instant
report of the incidents and outcomes all involved unique incidents, which create difficulty when
categorizing reports (Cooper, 1984). The implications for practice and research are related to a
need for further education, awareness, and vigilance (Cooper, 1984). More education is required
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as a preventive measure regarding the anesthesia machine and the possible malfunctions
resulting in patient injury (Cooper, 1984).
Joyal (2012) showcased a case in which the anesthesia workstation scavenging system
became occluded with a small piece of plastic that would allow the anesthesia workstation to be
functional and pass self-tests, but also expose a patient to high peak pressures. The anesthesia
workstation that was evaluated and used was eventually replaced, and the patient did not suffer
any harm (Joyal, 2012). Upon investigation, a small piece of plastic was causing occlusion
between the anesthesia workstation and the scavenging system (Joyal, 2012). Limitations to this
demonstration was the small sample size and no further demonstrations were completed (Joyal,
2012).
Kee et al. (2006) presented a case report of an inadvertent vaporizer selection
malfunction on the North American Drager Narkomed 2C. The purpose of this article was to
illustrate a potential safety threat in which both the Sevoflurane (Ultane) and Desflurane
(Suprane) vaporizers were simultaneously activated (Kee et al., 2006). After the induction of
general anesthetic with an endotracheal tube, an anesthesia provider was able to turn on multiple
anesthetic vaporizers at the same time (Kee et al., 2006). This should not be possible as all
modern anesthesia workstations have an interlock mechanism which prevents this safety
malfunction from happening. In this case the provider was able to quickly notice the malfunction
and was able to avoid causing patient harm (Kee et al., 2006). This could have been detected and
resolved prior to the induction of anesthesia if the responsible anesthesia provider had followed
the ASA’s (2008) recommended pre-anesthesia workstation checklist.
Lateef’s (2010) literature review article discussed the importance and pertinence of
simulation-based learning and how it applies to the medical field. It takes an entire team to be
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dedicated to the purpose of immersing themselves in a simulation-based scenario. Creating a safe
simulation area allows the user to explore and expand on their knowledge of complicated
situations that may arise within their practice (Lateef, 2010).
The addition of simulation-based training to the field of medicine builds morale and
cohesiveness (Lateef, 2010). These practices are designed to be the building blocks of algorithms
and protocols that guide healthcare practice (Lateef, 2010). First and foremost, the patient in a
simulation is never harmed, hoping that the simulation training would be beneficial when
something happens in a real-life situation (Lateef, 2010).
Lee et al. (2013) discussed the integrity and proper positioning of both the inspiratory and
expiratory unidirectional valves that are within the anesthesia workstation. The first case
reported describes an incident in which an expiratory unidirectional valve breakage resulted in
high end-tidal CO2 up to 52 mmHg, and the inspiratory CO2 went to 30 mmHg (Lee et al. 2013).
The valve was replaced, and the case went on without any other issues (Lee et al. 2013). The
patient was not harmed, but the immediate differential diagnosis was to rule out a deadly
anesthesia reaction known as malignant hyperthermia, which poses a significant patient safety
threat if misdiagnosed or mistreated (Lee et al. 2013).
The second case report was regarding the malposition of the unidirectional expiratory
valve. This resulted in end-tidal CO2 elevation and subsequent sloping of the capnography
waveform. Again, the patient suffered no harm, but the machine properly passed its self-test and
was not detected.
A closed claims report by Mehta et al. (2013), reviewed the Closed Claims Project
database of 9,806 incidents related to anesthesia workstation malfunctions. This Institutional
Review Board approved report had inclusion criteria for the cases were that they were general
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surgery cases and/or obstetric anesthesia care cases (n=6,022) (Mehta et al. 2013). The period in
which this study took place was from the 1970s to the 2000s (Mehta et al. 2013). The studies
were compared by chi-square tests, Fisher exact test, and Mann Whitney U test (Mehta et al.
2013).
The study concluded that closed claim gas delivery cases decreased over those years due
to advancements in technology (Mehta et al. 2013). However, provider error contributed
significantly to severe injury and the misdiagnosis or treatment of breathing circuit events
(Mehta et al. 2013).
The case report by Mohanty (2018) spoke about the pin index safety system that is used
internationally to protect patients from receiving hypoxic mixtures, carbon dioxide, helium, or
any combination of those that would be deemed detrimental. During this general anesthesia case,
it was found that an old carbon dioxide tank with a faulty pin index system was attached to the
oxygen hanger yoke on the back of the anesthesia workstation (Mohanty, 2018). The patient did
have a period of desaturation before the problem was recognized and fixed (Mohanty, 2018).
Once fixed, the case continued without issue and an oxygen tank was used appropriately
(Mohanty, 2018).
The argument for this case report took place in India, where they do not abide by the
standard colorization as the United States does (Mohanty, 2018). The call for color-coding was
the purpose of this case and the informative matter of connecting a mistaken tank to the hanger
yoke on the back of the anesthesia workstation (Mohanty, 2018).
In a case report, Pai (2021) discussed the malposition and improper seating of a CO2
canister absorbent on the Drager Apollo machine. This resulted in the inability of the machine to
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develop positive pressure during ventilation even though the machine had passed its self-test
(Pai, 2021).
No patient harm resulted from this experience, but the onus is placed on the anesthesia
provider to properly check the anesthesia workstation even further than simply doing a
anesthesia workstation self-test (Pai, 2021). Since the CO2 absorbent is a removable portion of
the anesthesia workstation, a proper inspection and seating of the canister is required to drive
positive ventilation pressure to the patient during general anesthesia (Pai, 2021). Therefore, this
requires an additional safety check in order to oblige with the standardized ASA safety standards
(Pai, 2021).
A case report by Pauling (2017) regarding the crossing of pipelines within a hospital
resulted in the death of a patient that had received 100% nitrous oxide during general anesthesia.
This case report discusses and poses the risks associated with delivering a hypoxic mixture to
patients during general anesthesia (Pauling, 2017).
The outcome of the case resulted in a patient's death (Pauling, 2017). The inspection into
the case revealed that the maintenance team mistakenly crossed the pipelines (Pauling, 2017).
Further vigilance is required during general anesthesia as these risks are still posed today due to
the maintenance required throughout hospitals (Pauling, 2017).
Saied (2012), created a simulation-based educational activity to teach anesthesia
providers the risk related to the loosening of the bellows cap on various anesthesia workstations.
Through this simulation-based educational activity providers developed interpersonal skills as
well as the skills to recognize and address that the bellows caps was loosened (Saied, 2012).
Subsequently, the anesthesia workstation would not be able to drive positive pressure during
general anesthesia and would result in apnea, hypercarbia, and possibly death if the leak source
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was not found (Saied, 2012). From that experience, this tool was developed to allow students to
experience a safe environment without the risk of patient harm (Saied, 2012).
Tharp’s (2016) case report discussed the successful management of an anesthesia
workstation failure with the Dräger Apollo (Draeger Inc). Approximately 45 minutes into this
case, while the patient was under general anesthesia and mechanical ventilation, the anesthesia
workstation failed to achieve positive pressurization following a high-pressure alarm (Tharp,
2016). Despite multiple maneuvers, the issue did not resolve until the machine was manually
powered off and on at the main power switch (Tharp, 2016).
This case exemplified the importance of having backup ventilation to ventilate a patient
when an anesthesia workstation fails (Tharp, 2016). Proper vigilance is needed to ensure that the
patient does not sustain any harm (Tharp, 2016). This was a near miss experience and the
problem was recognized and reconciled without patient harm (Tharp, 2016).
Theoretical Literature
The ASA Committee on equipment and facilities task force formulated evidence-based
recommendations for pre-anesthesia workstation checkouts to be performed both daily and
before each anesthetic. These checkout procedures improve patient safety and reduce the risk for
anesthesia workstation malfunctions or mishaps. As a result, they are widely accepted and
utilized within the anesthesia community.
Oster and Braaten (2016) created a handbook to serve as a patient safety and quality
resource for healthcare students and providers. The handbook explains safety concepts within a
framework illuminated by examples of applications to practice and consideration across a wide
variety of patients. The patient safety and quality resources by Oster and Braaten (2016) provide
a didactic framework for learners to form an informative foundation. Allowing learners to more
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effectively utilize active learning methods such as simulation-based education (Oster and
Braaten, 2016).
Related Literature
Subrahmanyam’s (2013) review article provided a detailed description of the anesthesia
workstations' safety features, mechanics, and reasoning. In addition, it shows possible
malfunctions and the potential risks associated with utilizing the anesthesia workstation. As a
result, there is an increased emphasis on the importance of vigilance in the delivery of
anesthetics. As well as an emphasis on the importance of performing adequate pre-surgical
checks to ensure that patient safety is not compromised.
Chiu et al. (2012) performed an experimental research study to test whether a simulation
training session would improve junior residents’ ability to perform a anesthesia workstation
check beyond the level of final year residents who only received didactic training. Experimental
anesthesia workstation training sessions were introduced to postgraduate year 1 (PGY-1)
residents (Chiu et al. 2012). PGY-1 residents performed a simulated anesthesia workstation
check to detect ten preset faults (Chiu et al. 2012). The control group was PGY-5 residents who
received only didactic training perform the same anesthesia workstation check (Chiu et al. 2012).
Data was collected from 37 simulation residents and 27 control residents, and the findings
showed that simulation residents had significantly higher checklist scores than the control
residents and identified more anesthesia workstation faults (Chiu et al. 2012). Simulation
residents repeated the study again in their senior year, and continued to achieve higher checklist
scores and identify more anesthesia workstation faults than control residents (Chiu et al. 2012).
Critical Summary
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The literature review presents consistencies related to anesthesia workstation
malfunctions that support the implementation of a simulation-based educational activity for
novice anesthesia providers. Using this simulation-based educational activity, novice anesthesia
providers can work through a variety of malfunctions. Each specific anesthesia workstation
malfunction has a unique presentation and poses a patient safety threat. These anesthesia
workstation malfunctions have been well documented within the literature and have been largely
attributed to human error. To combat these looming patient safety threats, novice anesthesia
providers must understand the importance of maintaining astute vigilance to detect and correct
any errors before they result in patient harm. The literature review shows the commonality
between case reports, studies, and their relationship with proper education, technique, and
vigilance of an anesthesia provider. For example, Joyal (2012) showcases an anesthesia
workstation malfunction related to a faulty scavenger system. While Kee et al. (2006) showcased
a malfunction that allowed two anesthesia workstation vaporizers to be turned on simultaneously
posing a different patient safety threat. Although these two cases pose two completely different
patient safety threats, the commonality amongst these cases are that the anesthesia providers
would have been able to detect and amend these issues if they had performed the ASA
recommended pre-anesthesia workstation checkout.
Additionally, Pauling et al. (2017) presented a case study that revealed the dangers of a
pipeline crossover that resulted in the death of a patient who received 100% nitrous oxide (N20).
The mistake was only discovered after the incident happened and it was the result of the a
stripped internal connection of the N20. This is a fault in the diameter index safety system (DISS)
(Pauling et al. 2017).
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Mohanty and Ahmad’s (2018) case study reiterates this theme. In this case there was a
misleading gas cylinder color coding system which almost resulted in serious patient harm.
During an endoscopic sinus surgery under general anesthesia there was a drop in central pipeline
pressure. When the O2 E-cylinder was opened it was found to be empty. Immediately thereafter
an attempt to mount another O2 E-cylinder to the hanger yoke was made, but it did not fit into the
pin index safety system (PISS). A third E-cylinder was finally installed and the patient was
provided with O2. The second O2 E-cylinder was actually found to be a CO2 cylinder that had
the same body color as a typical O2 cylinder. The presence of the PISS was able to prevent
serious patient harm in this case (Mohanty & Ahmad, 2018).
In a case study by Robards & Corda (2010), a hazard involving the gas sampling line and
adjustable pressure limiting (APL) valve on the Drager Apollo anesthesia workstation was
revealed. After the induction of general anesthesia with an endotracheal tube, ventilation could
not be achieved despite complete closure of the APL valve in the manual setting of the
anesthesia workstation. After extubating and reintubating the patient the anesthesia providers still
could not ventilate the patient and had to resort to an AMBU bag as a secondary source of
ventilation. In this instance the gas sample line had become wedged between the APL valve knob
and the anesthesia workstation surface, creating a significant air leak despite maximal closure of
the APL valve. Simply pulling the valve knob upwards and removing the sampling line from the
APL valve solved this problem (Robards & Corda, 2010).
Lee et al. (2013) presented a case study that was able to bypass the ASA checklist. A
patient was brought to the operating room and induced with no initial problems revealed. Shortly
after the case started the end-tidal CO2 (ETCO2) levels rose. This immediately gave suspicion of
malignant hyperthermia due to an elevated ETCO2 being one of the hallmark signs. Upon
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inspection, it was found that the unidirectional valve on the expiratory side of the anesthesia
workstation was broken (Lee et al. 2013).
The common themes in the literature are consistent human error despite design
improvements in the anesthesia workstation, component failures, design flaws, and machine
malfunctions/engineering failures. These themes are consistent amongst the supporting cases and
are important takeaways for novice anesthesia providers to gather from this educational process
improvement program. This project is aimed toward confirming this safety through rigorous
research and literature reviews.
Theoretical Framework
The Adult Learning Theory by Malcom Knowles (1978) supports the use of simulation as
an effective modality for adult learners. The Adult Learning Theory makes four assumptions
about the characteristics of an adult learner that are different from the assumptions about child
learners (Knowles, 1978). These four assumptions are that adults must be involved in the
planning and evaluation of their instruction; that experience (including mistakes) provides a basis
for the learning activities; that adults are most interested in learning subjects with immediate
relevance and impact on their job or personal life; and that adult learning is problem-centered
rather than content-oriented (Knowles, 1978). As the novice anesthesia providers participating in
this simulation-based educational activity are adult learners, Knowles' theory serves as a valuable
framework for this project.
Method
Design
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The design of this project is an educational process improvement program. This is the
first phase of this project and includes a literature review with a directed content analysis to
identify content for this simulation activity. It also includes the expert review to validate this
content.
Sample and Setting
The setting for the development of the project is FJTSA. The first part of the project uses
the literature as the source of the data to be analyzed. The second part of the project uses an
expert validation. This expert validation will be performed by experienced CRNA’s and
anesthesiologists preferably with precepting and/or education experience. Ten to twelve experts
will be invited with hopes of having six to eight completed data review forms.
The design will help to facilitate the pre-existing educational growth of novice anesthesia
providers. This project will continue to be developed by proceeding DNP cohorts at FJTSA.
Additionally, this project has the potential use for new hire orientation programs related to types
of anesthesia workstations in use and perhaps safety competency training of CRNAs already in
practice.
Ethical Considerations
Institutional review board (IRB) approval will be evaluated once this project is proposed
and defended.
Procedures for Data Collection
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The data collection for this project consists of the directed content analysis from the
review of the literature and the expert review of data collected to validate the content of the
simulation tool. The project objectives utilized focus on improving patient safety,
enhancing participant confidence, and improving anesthesia provider workstation
competence.
Plans for Data Analysis
The directed content analysis approach described by Hsieh and Shannon (2005) will be
used to examine the literature for relevant content to include in this educational process
improvement program. This directed qualitative content analysis method will serve as a reliable,
transparent, and comprehensive method for qualitative research (Abdolghader, et al. 2018). This
project will provide quantitative and qualitative data from the expert reviewers.
Implementation
The purpose of this project was to create an educational process improvement program
to standardize the education of novice anesthesia providers to prevent safety threats related to the
anesthesia delivery workstation. This was accomplished by implementing trigger videos that can
be could be used as educational content for novice anesthesia providers within anesthesia
departments.
Our team met on multiple occasions with experienced anesthesia providers to assess
common critical incidents that they have experienced related to the anesthesia workstation
throughout their professional career. We solicited the input from experienced anesthesia
providers including anesthesiologists and nurse anesthetists. These anecdotal qualitative
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interviews were conducted with experienced anesthesia providers and assisted us in selecting
five key scenario topics.
The time spent on the development of our trigger films and educational platform is as
follows: Twelve hours were spent polling and reviewing this information. Six hours were spent
developing scripts. Six hours were spent meeting with film technicians preparing for our filming
day. Six hours were spent filming trigger films. Six hours were spent meeting with a simulation
lab technician in the editing room identifying the key professional teaching points associated
with each trigger film.
Plan of Implementation
Action
Soliciting Feedback from
Experienced Anesthesia
Providers
Identifying core team for
trigger film production
Drill down on scripting
Filming trigger films

Editing trigger films

Incorporation of trigger films
with educational content

Discussion

Team
Robert Vitale, James Mahon,
and anesthesia providers

Hours
12 hours.

Robert Vitale, James Mahon,
Michael Kost, and Audrianna
Bustos
Robert Vitale, James Mahon,
and Michael Kost
Robert Vitale, James Mahon,
Michael Kost, and Audrianna
Bustos

6 hours

Robert Vitale, James Mahon,
Michael Kost, and Matt
White.
Robert Vitale, James Mahon,
and Michael Kost.

6 hours

10 hours
6 hours

10 Hours

24

Despite developing this educational platform with novice anesthesia providers in mind, it
can be further utilized at anesthesia departmental staff meetings within facilities such as Einstein
Medical Center Montgomery or through online narrated educational programs. Barriers of
implementation include the dissemination of this educational platform within anesthesia
departments to their target audience. The decision to make this a mandatory competency
requiring 100% compliance will be at the discretion of the anesthesia department that wishes to
implement this educational platform.
Project Committee
Chair: Dr. Michael Kost
Mentor: Dr. Barbara Hoerst/ Dr. Deborah Byrne
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Appendix B
Simulation-Based Educational Activity for Novice Anesthesia Providers Learning Safe
Management of The Anesthesia Workstation
Content Experts: Please critique parts of the draft of James Mahon and Robert Vitale. Please
read each section and rank the sections using the scale provided. Use yellow highlighting to
select the number on the scale, save the document, and email to Jamesmahon@live.com and
RV676096@gmail.com. Thank you very much. Circle your responses on the 4-point scale
provided. Kindly comment on additions, deletions, and revisions as you evaluate each section.
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